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Abstract: When employers cannot tell whether a school truly has many good students
or just gives easy grades, schools have an incentive to in°ate grades to help mediocre
students, despite concerns about preserving the value of good grades for good students.
We construct a signaling model where grades are in°ated in equilibrium. The inability
to commit to an honest grading policy reduces the informativeness of grades and hurts
schools. Grade in°ation by one school makes it easier for another school to pass some of
its own mediocre students as good ones with in°ated grades. Easy grades are strategic
complements, providing a channel to make grade exaggeration contagious.
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A common complaint today in higher education is that grades are too high and do not
accurately re°ect academic performance of college students (Juola [1968]; Carney et al.
[1978]; McKenzie [1979]; Kolevzon [1981]; Millman et al. [1983]; Sabot and Wakeman-Linn
[1991]; Kuh and Hu [1999]). It is not unusual to ¯nd As being awarded to half or more of
a class, with grades below B verging on extinction. High grades can be observed in both
public and private institutions, but elite schools have often been singled out as the prime
perpetrators of such misleading grading policies (The New York Times, May 22, 1988;
Lambert [1993]; Chronicle of Higher Education, November 16, 1994; The Boston Globe,
October 7{8, 2001; The Daily Telegraph, August 22, 2004).
Whether grades are too high or not must be understood with reference to certain
standards, and the controversy regarding high grades has sometimes been explained as a
case of mistaken benchmarks. For example, it has been suggested that college students
deserve better grades today because they are better than previous cohorts. According
to this argument, academic standards of students have improved over time, and grades
must adjust in the same direction to retain their informational content in any absolute
sense. This is, however, contradicted by college entrance test scores, which tend to show
a declining rather than increasing trend (Wilson [1999]). Another theory, particularly
favored by elite schools, is that the grading policy of a school should re°ect the quality of
its students (Perrin [1998]). Since elite schools have more selective admission standards,
higher grades in elite schools are fair and accurate to the extent that they re°ect the
superior aptitudes of their students relative to those in an average university. However,
this argument implicitly assumes that end-users of grades such as potential employers su®er
from \grade illusion," and are incapable of taking the di®erence in student standards into
consideration when interpreting grades from di®erent schools. Such illusion on its own does
not o®er a convincing basis to explain the observed behavior regarding in°ated grades, as
it is unlikely to a®ect the entire labor market persistently. It is also inconsistent with the
fact that, within a university, the most technically demanding courses and programs into
which the brightest students self-select are usually those with the toughest grading policies
(Sabot and Wakeman-Linn [1991]; Wilson [1999]).
1An interesting perspective on the issue of the informative content of grades appears
in a recent working paper by Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2003]. They argue that if the
assignment function from student ability to job desirability is concave, then a school will
¯nd it pro¯table to mix the high-ability students with the low-ability students, through
coarsening the information content of grades. To our knowledge, their paper is the only
formal model in which users of grades do not su®er from grade illusion. However, their
model explains compressed grades more than it does in°ated grades. Although grade
in°ation implies some degree of grade compression (grades cannot be raised beyond A+,
and the grade distribution becomes concentrated at the upper tail as more and more
students get high grades), the reverse is not true. There is no reason that the coarsening
of information should take the speci¯c form of in°ated grades as opposed to, say, de°ated
grades.
In this paper we present an equilibrium theory of in°ated grades.1 The model has
two main ingredients. First, schools observe the abilities of their individual students.
Second, employers know the distribution of grades in a school, but not the distribution of
student abilities within the school. When a school gives a lot of good grades, the labor
market cannot fully distinguish whether this is due to an overly liberal grading standard
or whether the school is blessed with a large proportion of high-ability students. This gives
rise to an incentive for the school to help some of its low-ability students by giving them
good grades. However, since employers have rational expectations, this strategy hurts
the high-ability students as the value of good grades becomes diluted. A priori, it is not
obvious that the terms of such a tradeo® necessarily imply in°ated grades. Nevertheless
we identify a condition about the objective of the school which ensures that it will in°ate
grades with a positive probability in equilibrium. We assume that the school cares more
about its high-ability students than its low-ability students. This assumption serves to
provide the \single-crossing condition" in our signaling model. It implies that schools with
more high-ability students have stronger incentives to give more good grades. Therefore in
1 Our equilibrium theory is not inconsistent with the idea that grade illusion sometimes occurs. Our
basic model shows that grades can be in°ated in equilibrium even without grade illusion. A straightforward
extension in Section III establishes that the possibility of grade illusion increases the equilibrium incidence
of in°ated grades.
2equilibrium the labor market sees a large percentage of good grades as a signal for a large
percentage of high-ability students. This inference property is understood by schools,
with the implication that elite schools tend to be more frequent perpetrators of grade
exaggeration.
In the \competitive" version of our model, we consider strategic interactions among
schools in grading policies that are generated through signaling. To focus on the signaling
aspect of the problem, we assume the labor market is su±ciently thick so that schools do
not directly compete with one another in placing students in a limited number of job slots.
Since wage o®ers can be conditioned on the individual school of the job applicant and on
the grading outcome of the school, any school that wants to maintain the credibility of its
grading policy can do so without worrying about in°ated grades in other schools. But if
the overall quality of student bodies are correlated (either positively or negatively) across
di®erent schools, employers can make inferences about student quality in one school by
looking at the general distribution of grades in other schools. We show that easy grades
are \strategic complements" in such a setting, and this creates a channel that makes grade
in°ation contagious.
It should be pointed out that the issue addressed in this paper departs from the focus
of much of the current debate on grade in°ation in academia, which is on the incremental
increase of grades over time. The \in°ation" analyzed in this paper refers to exaggerated
representation of underlying fundamentals, rather than to the time trend. While it is
interesting to understand why grades have been creeping up for the last few decades, we
feel that it is equally important to explore whether and why grades are too high relative
to some well-de¯ned welfare criterion. In our model, grades are too high because they
are in°ated to signal a high percentage of high-ability students, and schools would be
unambiguously better o® if they could commit to honestly revealing the true distribution
of student quality. Our comparative statics results help one understand what determines
the extent of grade in°ation. As brie°y discussed in the concluding section, our equilibrium
model of in°ated grades may also provide a foundation for dynamic analysis.
Central to our model is the information asymmetry between providers and end-users
of evaluations, and the fact that evaluators care about interests of the evaluated. This
3being the case, it should be clear that our analysis is of more than \academic" interest.
Consumers often ¯nd themselves in the situation of relying on the product evaluations of
more informed experts. Yet, many experts have close ties with producers, so that they
may want to misrepresent the information to steer consumers' decisions in their desired
directions. Consumers are then left with the task of deciphering the informational con-
tent of their recommendations, knowing full well the inherent bias, in much the same way
that employers have to interpret the grades of job applicants issued by universities. For
example, consumers who consult audio magazines for recommendations on stereo equip-
ment purchases will likely come away with the impression that there is hardly any piece of
equipment which the reviewers do not like, simply because advertisement revenue depends
on the good relationship with dealers and manufacturers of the very equipment that these
magazines review. In this case, indiscriminate raving is constrained only by the need to dif-
ferentiate the truly outstanding products from the run-of-the-mill types.2 Other examples
of in°atable ratings that are of great relevance to the business world are company audits
prepared by accounting ¯rms and stock market recommendations issued by investment
banks. Chinese walls notwithstanding, it is not unreasonable to suspect that auditors and
investment analysts may have the interest of their clients rather than that of investors at
heart. One manifestation of this incentive structure is the excess of \buy" over \sell" rec-
ommendations.3 Similarly, an auditor may have the incentive to declare a risky company
healthy, if only to maintain a cozy long term relationship with its client. But doing so
dilutes the value of the auditor's seal of approval and therefore is not in the interest of its
other clients that are ¯nancially more sound. The ine±ciency of such a game is obvious,
and so are the potential dangers. But until a better system is established that provides a
greater incentive for truthful transmission of information, analysts and investors alike will
continue to play this high stake game of rational deception.
2 Our model also contributes to the economic analysis of media bias (e.g., Dyck and Zingales [2002];
Mullainathan and Shleifer [2002]). Just as a school has to play the dual role of the advocate and the judge,
the media faces a similar incentive structure.
3 Morgan and Stocken (2003) use a standard cheap talk model to study the incentive structure in
stock recommendations. Equilibrium in their model involves information coarsening, but does not entail
the feature of exaggeration as in our signaling setup.
4II. A Signaling Model
A school has two types of students: good students (type G), with productivity !G; and
mediocre students (type M), with a lower productivity !M. There are two possible states
of the world. In state F, which happens with probability ¼, the overall quality of the
student body is favorable, with a proportion ÁF of good students. In the unfavorable state
U, the school has a smaller proportion ÁU of good students. We note that the \school" in
our model may be interpreted as a single class, a department, or the whole university. The
degree of uncertainty regarding the state may di®er, but the anlysis for grade in°ation is
identical regardless of the level of aggregation.
We assume that individual student types and the state of the world are private knowl-
edge of the school. In particular, potential employers in the labor market observe neither
student types nor the state of the world. The state of the world in our model incorpo-
rates the result of the school's admission exercise, the success of which in attracting good
students can vary in degree from year to year, and also re°ects the inherent uncertainty
in the outcome of the school's educational process. Even with the same admission policy,
and even if the school were able to admit students with the same distribution of observable
characteristics over time, the value added of education to individual graduates is stochastic
and only imperfectly observed. Given the considerable time that students spend at school
and the extensive evaluation by teachers, the school is in a better position to assess the
abilities of its graduates than anyone else. For simplicity, we have assumed that the school
perfectly observes the type of each individual student and therefore knows the state of
the world, but our results hold as long as the potential employers have less knowledge
regarding student types and the state of the world.4
The school gives each student either grade A or B. We assume that the school can
send one of two signals: give A to a fraction ÁF of students (easy grading, or e), or give
4 One may argue that employers generally have a reasonable idea of the quality of students in a
particular school, from the school's reputation and published admission standards. Yet, in reality, much of
the information about individual students or average student quality is supplied by the school, whether in
the form of transcripts or reference letters. The reason is that the process by which education enhances the
productivity of di®erent students is not well-understood. Students with similar observable characteristics
and performance at admission may diverge signi¯cantly in their academic achievements and marketability
upon graduation.
5A to a fraction ÁU of students (tough grading, or t). Since there may indeed be a large
fraction of type G students who deserve an A, easy grades are not synonymous to in°ated
grades. Grades are said to be in°ated when easy grading (e) is chosen in the unfavorable
state (U).
The assumption of binary signals rules out grading policies that result in a fraction
of A grades di®erent from ÁF or ÁU, or policies that use more than the two grades A and
B. It helps us to focus on the issue of in°ated grades.5 We impose further restrictions
on the school's grading policy. When grades are in°ated, all the ÁU good students and a
measure ÁF ¡ÁU of mediocre students are chosen randomly to receive grade A. Similarly,
tough grading in the favorable state means that all mediocre students are B-students, but
a randomly selected proportion of good students are also given B's.6
The labor market is competitive in that students are paid their expected productivity.
Potential employers in the labor market, unable to observe individual student types or
the state of the world, can condition the wage o®er to a student on his grade (A or B)
and on his school's grading outcome (e or t). In other words, when presented with a
transcript, an employer would have to make inferences on the student's ability based on
expectations about the grade distribution: an A grade by itself is largely meaningless if it is
not interpreted in the context of how many A's are given.7 We stress that we are making
two assumptions about the labor market here. First, potential employers do not have
grade illusion; they hold rational expectations about the relation between the signal and
the state. Second, potential employers perfectly observe the grading outcome of the school.
These two assumptions are made to focus on the implications of rational expectations. In
5 In principle, the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) can be used to construct a model of
grade compression, with continuous types and continuous signals. Our model of binary types and binary
signals is the simplest kind that avoids the compression issue.
6 Our model of in°ated grades is not a standard signaling model, because there are two kinds of signals,
individual grades and grades distributions. The assumption of binary signals and the restrictions on the
grading policies ensure that our model can be analyzed using the standard techniques in the signaling
literature. Note that an implication is that individual grades are never entirely random, and as a result
the two signals e and t are not cheap talk.
7 The analogy from price in°ation is that nominal prices must be interpreted in the context of the
general price level or the money supply.
6reality, grade illusion may occur and employers' information on the grading outcome may
be imperfect. Later in Section III, we extend the basic model to allow for these possibilities.
The school maximizes a weighted sum of the wage o®ers to its type G and type M
students. This models the school's desire to use its grading policy to help the graduates
to obtain the best placement results at the entry level of the labor market. The kind of
objective function assumed here may be justi¯ed by anticipated donations from successful
alumni down the road, by the school's current need to attract good students, or by simple
altruistic motives. Let R be the relative weight on the wage o®ers to good students. We
assume that R > 1; that is, the school cares more about the placement results of its good
students than those of the mediocre students. If R = 1, then any grading policy would
give the same level of payo® to the school since the unweighted sum of wage o®ers to all
students is a constant when employers have rational expectations. If R < 1, the interest of
the school and the interest of employers would be diametrically opposed, and grades would
cease to become useful signals of student ability.8 The assumption of R > 1 is based on
the observation that alumni contributions to their alma mater are likely to be increasing
in their abilities: a Nobel prize for a distinguished alumnus will do much more in boosting
the academic reputation of a university than producing a number of mediocre scholars,
and the school may reap a ¯nancial windfall if a star student ends up as the CEO of a
major corporation. It is natural that schools would care more about helping their good
students successfully launch their careers.
The assumption that R > 1 provides the \single-crossing" condition (Spence [1973])
in our signaling model. To see this, let w(Aje) and w(Bje) be the wages paid to A and B-
students, respectively, when the market observes easy grades given by a school. Similarly,
let w(Ajt) and w(Bjt) be the wages paid to A and B-students when grading is tough. In
the favorable state, the di®erence in payo®s to the school between easy grading and tough
grading is
V (ejF) ¡ V (tjF) =[RÁFw(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)w(Bje)]
¡ [RÁUw(Ajt) + R(ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Bjt) + (1 ¡ ÁF)w(Bjt)]:
8 The school would like to give mediocre students A grades and give good students B grades. Employers
would see through this and assign di®erent meanings to A and B grades.
7In the unfavorable state, the di®erence in payo®s is
V (ejU) ¡ V (tjU) =[RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)w(Bje)]
¡ [RÁUw(Ajt) + (1 ¡ ÁU)w(Bjt)]:
The single-crossing condition requires the school to have stronger incentive to choose easy
grading in the favorable state than in the unfavorable state. In other words, we require
(1) [V (ejF) ¡ V (tjF)] ¡ [V (ejU) ¡ V (tjU)] = (R ¡ 1)(ÁF ¡ ÁU)(w(Aje) ¡ w(Bjt)) > 0:
If, in equilibrium, employers expect that an easy A is better than a tough B (which is
indeed the case, as we will demonstrate in the following analysis), then the assumption
R > 1 guarantees that the single-crossing condition (1) is satis¯ed. Intuitively, the school
has a stronger incentive to give more A's (choose easy grading) in the favorable state
because there are more good students who deserve the grade. Because of this incentive
structure, employers rationally use easy grading as a positive signal for the favorable state.
This in turn allows the school to engage in some degree of equilibrium grade exaggeration
(choosing easy grading in the unfavorable state), as in a standard signaling model.
III. Signaling by a Single School
This section deals with signaling by a single school. The analysis applies more generally
to the case of more than one school, provided that the quality of the student body in each
school (i.e., the favorable or unfavorable state) is uncorrelated with one another.
Because of the incentive structure induced by the single-crossing property, we look
for an \in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium," in which the school adopts the following
policy. In the favorable state F, the school chooses e and is \honest" about the quality
of its students. It gives all the ÁF good students A grades and all the 1 ¡ ÁF mediocre
students B grades. In the unfavorable state U, the school randomizes between e and t.
With probability 1 ¡ p, the school is \honest" and chooses t: only the ÁU good students
receive A grades. With probability p, the school in°ates grades by choosing e. In that
case, all ÁU good students get A grades, a measure ÁF ¡ÁU of mediocre students also get
A grades, and the remaining 1 ¡ ÁF mediocre students receive B grades.
8Given such a policy, tough grading is a sure sign of the unfavorable state. The updated
probability of state F is zero. Therefore the wage o®er to A-students is w(Ajt) = !G and
the wage o®er to B-students is w(Bjt) = !M. When the market observes easy grading, on
the other hand, this could be due to either grade exaggeration or a large fraction of good
students. Using Bayes' rule, the updated probability of state F is
(2) q(Fje) =
¼
¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p
:
Competitive wage o®er to A-students is
























as the wage for A-students when the school is believed to have in°ated the grades. Note
that ! is the lowest possible wage for A-students. We can write equation (3) simply as:
(5) w(Aje) = q(Fje)!G + (1 ¡ q(Fje))!:
The wage o®er to B-students is w(Bje) = !M.
Proposition 1. There is a unique in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium if and only if
(6) ¼ < ° ´
(R ¡ 1)ÁU
(R ¡ 1)ÁU + ÁF
;









Proof of Proposition 1. The necessary and su±cient conditions for a semi-pooling
equilibrium are: (i) in state F the school weakly prefers e to t:
RÁFw(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M ¸ RÁU!G + R(ÁF ¡ ÁU)!M + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M;
9and (ii) in state U the school is indi®erent between e and t:
RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M = RÁU!G + (1 ¡ ÁU)!M:
Using equations (2) and (3), we can solve for the school's equilibrium probability p¤ of
in°ating the grades from condition (ii). The solution is given by equation (7) as stated
in the proposition. Condition (6) in the proposition is equivalent to the requirement that
p¤ < 1. Finally, since R > 1 and w(Aje) > w(Bjt) = !M, the single-crossing condition (1)
is satis¯ed. Therefore, condition (ii) implies condition (i). Q.E.D.
In the subsequent analysis it is often convenient to characterize the equilibrium di-
rectly in terms of q(Fje). To this end, we rewrite the indi®erence condition between e and
t in state U as
(8) RÁU(!G ¡ w(Aje)) = (ÁF ¡ ÁU)(w(Aje) ¡ !M):
The left-hand-side represents the cost of in°ating the grades; the right-hand-side represents
the bene¯t. In equilibrium, the wage w(Aje) given by (5) must satisfy condition (8). Using
the expression for ° de¯ned in the statement of Proposition 1, we can state the equilibrium
indi®erence condition simply as:
(9) q(Fje) = °:
Intuitively speaking, q(Fje) is the probability in state U of \fooling" the market into
believing that the state is favorable. An in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium occurs when
the school's probability p of in°ating the grades is such that its equilibrium probability
q(Fje) of fooling the market is equal to °. Note that ° is a number between 0 and 1. The
function q(Fje) is decreasing in the probability of in°ated grades p, with q(Fje) = 1 at
p = 0 and q(Fje) = ¼ at p = 1. Therefore, a unique solution p¤ 2 (0;1) exists for any
° 2 (¼;1).
What happens if ° · ¼? An \in°ationary pooling equilibrium" would result, in which
the school chooses easy grading in both state F and state U with probability 1.
10Proposition 2. There exists an in°ationary pooling equilibrium if and only if ¼ ¸ °.
Proof of Proposition 2. We need to prove the school weakly prefers e to t in both
state U and state F if ¼ ¸ °. In a pooling equilibrium, since the school always chooses
e, the market does not update its probability assessment for state F upon observing easy
grading. The competitive wage o®er to A-students is
(10) w(Aje) = ¼!G + (1 ¡ ¼)!:
The wage o®er to B-students is !M. Let the out-of-equilibrium belief be that the state is
U when t is observed. Then the competitive wage o®er would be !G to A-students and
!M to B-students. Since ¼ ¸ °, one can verify that the school weakly prefers e to t in
state U. Since the single-crossing condition is satis¯ed, weak preference for e in state U
implies strict preference for e in state F.
Consider the reverse statement. In an in°ationary pooling equilibrium, when deviation
to t occurs, A-students get !G while the wage w(Bjt) for B-students depends on the out-
of-equilibrium belief. However, for any belief, we have w(Bjt) ¸ !M. In equilibrium the
school weakly prefers e to t in state U. Therefore,
RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M ¸ RÁU!G + (1 ¡ ÁU)w(Bjt);
where w(Aje) is given by equation (10). Since w(Bjt) ¸ !M, the above inequality implies
that w(Aje) ¸ q(Fje)!G + (1 ¡ q(Fje))!, from which it follows that ¼ ¸ °. Q.E.D.
Signaling models are often plagued by multiplicity of equilibria. Though the in°ation-
ary (semi-pooling or pooling) equilibrium we have identi¯ed is natural in our setting, there
may be other equilibrium outcomes in our model, for example, grade de°ation. If this
is the case, the comparative statics and welfare results that we will present below would
lose much of their force, because it is not clear which of the multiple equilibria would be
observed. In Appendix A we show how existence of other types of equilibria is ruled out
by a combination of the single-crossing condition and standard re¯nement criteria in the
signaling literature.
11A. Comparative Statics
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the school's equilibrium probability of in°ating the grades
(choosing e in state U) is











Equation (11) shows that a greater concern for the good students lowers the school's
probability of in°ating the grades. Intuitively, a greater R increases the cost of in°ating
the grades (the left-hand-side of equation (8)) while keeping the bene¯t unchanged. As a
result equilibrium p¤ must decrease to increase q(Fje) and w(Aje) in order to restore the
indi®erence condition (9).
An increase in ÁF=ÁU increases the school's equilibrium probability of in°ating the
grades. Increases in ÁF=ÁU may occur when employers face a greater uncertainty in the
inference of abilities from grades due to a more diverse student body (the variance of the
two-point distribution regarding the state is proportional to the squared di®erence between
ÁF and ÁU.) In terms of our model, the ratio ÁF=ÁU represents the feasible extent of grade
exaggeration: since the fraction of in°ated A grades is 1 ¡ ÁU=ÁF, the higher the ratio,
the more misleading grades the school reports when grades are in°ated.9 From condition
(8), one can see that an increase in ÁF=ÁU raises the bene¯t of in°ation relative to the
cost: in state F, the number of mediocre students who bene¯t from grade exaggeration
is ÁF ¡ ÁU, and the number of good students who bear the cost of a diminished A grade
is ÁU. As a result equilibrium p¤ must decrease to increase q(Fje) in order to restore the
indi®erence condition.
One interesting observation is that the probability of in°ating the grades does not
depend on the productivity premium !G=!M. This is because an increase in productivity
premium !G=!M has two opposing e®ects. On one hand, from equation (5), raising !G=!M
increases w(Aje) for any given equilibrium probability of grade in°ation. In the absence
9 In our two-state model with binary student types, changes in ÁF and ÁU a®ect not only the quality
of the student body, but the meaning of the grading outcomes (e and t) as well. Given this feature of our
model, we prefer to interpret ÁF=ÁU as a parameter that describes the feasible extent of grade in°ation
as opposed to one that is about average student quality.
12of other e®ects, this would force p¤ to go up in order to restore the indi®erence condition
(9). On the other hand, from equation (8) we can see that raising !G=!M increases the
cost of in°ating the grades relative to the bene¯t, which tends to reduce p¤. These two
e®ects exactly cancel each other given the linear feature of the model.
Equation (11) also shows that the school's probability of in°ating the grades increases
with the probability of the favorable state. An increase in ¼ directly a®ects the cost and
the bene¯t of in°ating the grades only through its e®ect on w(Aje). From equation (2),
a greater ¼ increases the likelihood that easy grading is justi¯ed by the favorable state.
This tends to raise w(Aje), decreasing the cost and increasing the bene¯t of in°ating the
grades. To restore indi®erence, the school must in°ate more often to reduce w(Aje) back
to its original level.
Most of the reports on in°ated grades in the popular press focuses on elite schools,
perhaps because these schools are more visible and make better news stories. Whether
elite schools in fact are more prone to in°ating the grades awaits more rigorous empirical
analysis, but our comparative statics exercise makes two cautionary points. First, an elite
school may be more likely to attract good students or more likely to produce good students
(a greater ¼), which would result in a greater p¤.10 An elite university can claim with a
straight face that most of its students get A's because they are all good students|often
the claim is indeed true, but a similar claim made by a lesser school is less convincing.
Second, elite schools tend to exaggerate grades more because of greater credibility of their
in°ated claims and therefore higher expected bene¯t from making such claims, not because
their students are \better" per se. As discussed above, proportionate increases in both !G
and !M, which imply a higher quality of students in both states, have no e®ect on the
school's equilibrium probability of in°ating the grades, even though both the good and
the mediocre students in an elite school command higher wages than graduates of other
schools. The same is true with proportionate increases in both ÁU and ÁF.
Additional comparative statics results can be obtained if we allow for the possibility
of grade illusion or imperfect observation of the grading outcome. The structure of the
10 Recent accounting scandals took place at a time when investors were exceptionally bullish about the
economy. Perhaps in°ated pro¯t ¯gures would have been much less credible at leaner times.
13two extensions is similar; for convenience we present them simultaneously. Let ´ 2 [0;1)
be the fraction of potential employers that take grades at face values or the fraction of
employers that do not observe the grading outcome of the school. In both cases, the critical
equilibrium condition remains equation (9), the indi®erence condition in state U between e
and t.11 However, instead of q(Fje), we have the average probability of fooling the market,
given by (1¡´)q(Fje)+´^ q, where q(Fje) is the same as before, de¯ned by equation (2), and
^ q is the e®ective probability of fooling the market with a grade A when potential employers
either take grades at face values or make an uninformed guess at the state without knowing
the grading outcome. In the ¯rst case, ^ q = 1, because an employer with grade illusion takes
the grade A as the de¯nitive sign of a good student. In the second case, ^ q = ¼, because
an employer without the knowledge of the signal retains the prior belief about the state.12
Since q(Fje) lies between ¼ and 1, an increase in ´ shifts up the average probability of
fooling the market in the case of grade illusion, and shifts down the average probability in
case of imperfect observation of the signal. Thus, the equilibrium probability of in°ating
the grades increases with the possibility of grade illusion and decreases with the possibility
of imperfect observation.
So far, we have not considered possible detection of \mislabeling" of students by
employers, but this can also be easily incorporated. Suppose there is a certain chance that
mediocre students with in°ated grades will be identi¯ed. This would impose a cost on
the school, because the wages for such students will be reduced or the reputation of the
school will be damaged. In this case, the school's payo® if it chooses easy grading under
the unfavorable state is
RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)(w(Aje) ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ÁF)w(Bje);
11 It is straightforward to show that the single-crossing condition remains valid in both extensions.
Thus, as in the basic model, indi®erence in state U implies strict preference for e in state F.
12 Alternatively, one can imagine that an uninformed employer who gets an A-student updates the
belief according to the equilibrium strategy and the assumption that the grade is randomly drawn from
the entire grade distribution. This yields ^ q = ¼ÁF=[¼ÁF +(1¡¼)(pÁF +(1¡p)ÁU)]. It is straightforward
to show that for any probability p of in°ating the grades less than 1, ^ q < q(Fje). Thus, the conclusion
remains that an increase in ´ reduces the equilibrium probability of in°ating the grades.
14where c is the expected unit cost of exaggerating a student's grade. Following the same
analysis as before, it can be shown that, in a semi-pooling equilibrium, the school's equi-
librium probability of in°ating the grades is decreasing in the \dishonesty cost" c. It is
conceivable that the cost c would di®er across academic disciplines. Competence in the
physical sciences and engineering is usually more easily established through examinations
than is competence in the social sciences and humanities. A physics department that is
caught giving a mediocre student an A grade may su®er a great loss in reputation as em-
ployers attribute the mislabeling to lax standards. A sociology department caught in the
same situation may be given the bene¯t of the doubt as it is di±cult for the department to
reliably assess the quality of its students to begin with. Therefore, the dishonesty cost is
probably higher in physics than in sociology. This may explain why the problem of in°ated
grades is often found to be more serious in the social sciences and humanities than in the
natural sciences (Sabot and Wakeman-Linn [1991]; Wilson [1999]).13
The idea of a dishonesty cost to the school can be pro¯tably applied to shed some
light on the question of why the problem of in°ated grades has become worse in recent
decades. Some authors have suggested that, over the years, there has been an increasing
consumerism in higher education, with students and parents expecting higher returns (in
job or graduate school placements) to their hefty investments, to be facilitated by lenient
grading (Levine and Cureton [1998]). The pressure on instructors has been further aggra-
vated by the increasing use of course evaluation in tenure and promotion decisions. With a
higher personal cost of antagonizing students, many instructors simply accede to students'
demand and e®ectively resort to bribing students for higher ratings and enrollments with
easy grades (Nichols and Soper [1972], Kelley [1972], Capozza [1973], Nelson and Lynch
[1984], Dickson [1984], and Zangenehzadeh [1988]). Occasional admonitions notwithstand-
ing, departments and administrations apparently have done little to reverse the trend,
perhaps mindful of the potential implications on resources. It appears, therefore, that
the grading policies adopted by instructors are not inconsistent with the objective of the
university. In terms of our model, this amounts to an increase over time in the concern
13 Economics is an exception among the social sciences: it is among the group of low-grading depart-
ments.
15for the overall placement results of the students, relative to the dishonesty cost c, in the
school's objective function. These changes would raise the incentive to exaggerate grades,
resulting in the in°ationary trend that has been so widely reported.
B. Welfare Analysis
Grade exaggeration a®ects the welfare of good and mediocre students di®erently. In equi-
librium a good student always gets grade A, and receives an expected payo® of
¼w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ¼)(p¤w(Aje) + (1 ¡ p¤)!G):
Since !G > w(Aje), the good student is worse o® when grades are in°ated (p¤ > 0) than he
would be if there were no grade in°ation. Furthermore, the welfare of the good student falls
monotonically with the school's probability of in°ating the grades. A higher p¤ adversely
a®ects a good student in two ways: it reduces the probability (1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ p¤) of receiving
the deserved wage !G when the school chooses tough grading, and it reduces the market
estimate w(Aje) of the productivity of A-students when the school chooses easy grading.
The opposite is true with a mediocre student. He gets grade B in the favorable state
and has a probability (ÁF ¡ÁU)=(1¡ÁU) of getting an in°ated grade A in the unfavorable
state. His expected equilibrium payo® is:
¼!M + (1 ¡ ¼)
µ










Since w(Aje) > !M, a mediocre student is better o® when grades are in°ated than what
he would otherwise be if there were no grade in°ation. Furthermore his welfare rises
monotonically with the school's probability of in°ating the grades. An increased use of
grade in°ation improves his chance of receiving a higher wage w(Aje) instead of !M, but
reduces the wage o®er w(Aje) at the same time. The net e®ect is positive, as the derivative





! ¡ !M + q2(Fje)(!G ¡ !)
¢
> 0:
Therefore, the two types of students have opposing interests with regard to grade exagger-
ation.
16Although grade exaggeration hurts good students and bene¯ts mediocre ones, the
school is unambiguously worse o® in a signaling equilibrium compared to a situation where
student ability is public information. Under public information, all good students get A
grades and are paid !G, while all mediocre students get B grades and are paid !M. The
school's payo® is then
¼(RÁF!G + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M) + (1 ¡ ¼)(RÁU!G + (1 ¡ ÁU)!M):
With imperfect information, the school's expected equilibrium payo® in state F is
RÁFw(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M;
and the expected payo® in state U is
(1 ¡ p¤)(RÁU!G + (1 ¡ ÁU)!M) + p¤(RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M):
In a semi-pooling equilibrium, p¤ is such that the school is indi®erent between the two
signals e and t, so the expected payo® in state U is simply
RÁU!G + (1 ¡ ÁU)!M:
The school is worse o® in the semi-pooling equilibrium compared to the case when student
ability is public information, because grade exaggeration lowers the wage o®er to its good
students in state F from !G to w(Aje), without increasing the school's expected payo® in
state U. In a pooling equilibrium with p¤ = 1, the expected payo® in state U is
RÁUw(Aje) + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Aje) + (1 ¡ ÁF)!M;
where w(Aje) is given by equation (10). A few steps of straightforward calculations reveal
that the school's equilibrium expected payo® is lower than in the case of public information
if and only if
(R ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ ÁU=ÁF)(¼ÁF + (1 ¡ ¼)ÁU)(!G ¡ !M) > 0;
which is true because R > 1.
17The result that the school is worse o® in a signaling equilibrium compared to the case
when student ability is public information is due to the inability of the school to commit
to an honest grading policy. The private incentives to tinker with grades and help a few
mediocre students hurt the school because the market understands such incentives and
makes adjustments in wage o®ers accordingly. This result is similar in spirit to the cele-
brated result about rules versus discretion in the literature on monetary in°ation (Kydland
and Prescott [1977]).
In the present model, employers always pay workers their expected productivities.
Their welfare is una®ected by grade exaggeration. In a more general setting, however,
employers care about optimal task assignment according to ability (e.g., Gibbons and
Waldman [1999]) and about optimal sorting by worker ability (e.g., Kremer [1993]). By
coarsening the informational content of grades as signals of worker quality, grade exagger-
ation will have a negative e®ect on total output in such kind of environments.
IV. Signaling by Two Schools
Our model of signaling by a single school indicates that the problem of in°ated grades is not
merely one of \racing to the bottom" in the competition among schools. The phenomenon
arises more fundamentally from the inability of schools to commit to an honest grading
policy in an environment with private information. Nevertheless introducing strategic
interactions among schools in this kind of environment is useful, because it can help us
address questions such as the following: Do strategic interactions among schools tend to
encourage or constrain grade exaggeration? How does grade exaggeration spread from one
school to another?
In principle one can consider many kinds of strategic interactions among schools. For
example, schools may compete in helping to place their graduates in a ¯xed number of
desirable job slots, or they may compete in trying to attract the most promising incoming
students. To focus on the signaling aspect of school competition, we choose to ignore
such direct competitions. Instead our attention is restricted to an environment in which
the labor market is su±ciently thick that all students receive wage o®ers equal to their
18expected marginal product. In this environment the only channel through which schools
interact with one another is the signals they send through grades.
Consider a model in which there are two identical schools, 1 and 2. Each school
knows its own state but not the state of the other school. Employers do not observe
the state in either school. The correlation structure of the states in the two schools is
















z = Pr[FjjFi] = Pr[UjjUi];
for i 6= j (i;j = 1;2). The parameter z varies between 0 (perfect negative correlation) and
1 (perfect positive correlation). When z = 1
2, the two schools have independent states.
Note also that, for simplicity, we have eliminated the parameter ¼ in the single-school
model. In the present two-school model, the unconditional probability of the favorable
state in either school is:




Once again, we consider an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium, in which each school
i = 1;2 chooses ei in state Fi and randomizes between ei and ti in state Ui. Let pi be the
probability that school i chooses easy grading in the unfavorable state.















2(1 ¡ z) + 1
2zp1
;
q(F1jt1;e2) = q(F1jt1;t2) = 0:
The competitive wage o®er to B-students is always equal to !M. The wage o®er to A-
19students depends on observed grading outcomes:
w(A1je1;e2) = q(F1je1;e2)!G + (1 ¡ q(F1je1;e2))!;
w(A1je1;t2) = q(F1je1;t2)!G + (1 ¡ q(F1je1;t2))!;
w(A1jt1;e2) = w(A1jt1;t2) = !G;
where ! is the wage for an A-student when his school is believed to have in°ated its grades,
as de¯ned by equation (4) in the previous section.
We ¯rst establish that the single-crossing condition continues to hold in the two-school
case. We will show that for any z 2 (0;1), if school 1, say, weakly prefers easy grading to
tough grading in state U1, then it strictly prefers easy grading to tough grading in state F1.
Let w(A1jU1) be school 1's expectation about the wage of its A-students when it chooses
easy grading in the unfavorable state. We have
w(A1jU1) = (1 ¡ z)w(A1je1;e2) + z(p2w(A1je1;e2) + (1 ¡ p2)w(A1je1;t2)):
Similarly, let w(A1jF1) be school 1's expectation about the wage of its A-students when it
chooses easy grading in the favorable state:
w(A1jF1) = zw(A1je1;e2) + (1 ¡ z)(p2w(A1je1;e2) + (1 ¡ p2)w(A1je1;t2)):
The single-crossing condition requires that V (e1jF1) ¡ V (t1jF1) > V (e1jU1) ¡ V (t1jU1).
Following the same manipulations as those in Section III, this can be written as:
(R ¡ 1)(ÁF ¡ ÁU)(w(A1jU1) ¡ !M) + RÁF(w(A1jF1) ¡ w(A1jU1)) > 0:
Since R > 1 and w(A1jU1) > !M, the ¯rst term in the above equation is positive. Fur-
thermore one can verify that, for any z 2 (0;1),
w(A1jF1) ¡ w(A1jU1) = (1 ¡ p2)(2z ¡ 1)(w(A1je1;e2) ¡ w(A1je1;t2)) ¸ 0:
Therefore the single-crossing condition is indeed satis¯ed.
In the single-school case, the assumption that R > 1 helps to ensure that the incentive
for a school to choose easy grading is greater in the favorable state than in the unfavorable
20state. In the present case, there is another reason that the single-crossing condition is
satis¯ed: a school expects its A-students to receive higher expected wages in the favorable
state than in the unfavorable state, i.e., w(A1jF1) ¸ w(A1jU1). This is because with
negative correlation, in state F1 school 2 is likely to be in state U2 and with probability 1¡p2
will not in°ate. This helps school 1's A-students because when the states are negatively
correlated, employers attach a higher probability to F1 upon observing (e1;t2). With
positive correlation, the reasoning is the opposite and but reaches the same conclusion. In
state F1, school 2 is likely to be in state F2 and will for sure have easy grades. This again
helps school 1's A-students. Due to positive correlation of the states, employers attach a
higher probability to F1 if the signal is (e1;e2).
Let us consider the symmetric case. Let p be the common probability of easy grading
in the unfavorable state. In an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium, school 1 must be in-
di®erent between easy grading and tough grading in the unfavorable state. Straightforward
calculations lead to the following indi®erence condition:
(13) k(p) = °;
where the parameter ° is given by equation (6), and the function k(p) is given by
k(p) = (1 ¡ z + zp)q(F1je1;e2) + z(1 ¡ p)q(F1je1;t2):
As in the single-school case, the function k(p) can be interpreted as the probability in
state Ui of \fooling" the market when school i chooses easy grading. Equation (13) above
reduces to equation (9) in the single-school case when z = 1
2 (the prior probability of state
F is ¯xed at 1
2 in the imperfect correlation model we have constructed.) In state U1, school
1 expects that the other school chooses easy grading with probability 1 ¡z +zp, in which
case the market assessment for the probability of state F1 is q(F1je1;e2). If the other school
chooses tough grading, on the other hand, the market assessment for the probability of
state F1 is q(F1je1;t2). In any in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium, the probability that
school 1 in state U1 fools the market is equal to °.
Proposition 3. For any z 2 (0;1), there exists an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium
if ° > 1
2, and there exists an in°ationary pooling equilibrium if ° · 1
2. Furthermore,
if z · 1
2 and ° > 1
2, the in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium is unique.
21Proof of Proposition 3. For any z 2 (0;1), the function k(p) is continuous in p with
k(0) = 1 and k(1) = 1
2. Therefore, if ° > 1
2, there exists a p¤ 2 (0;1) such that k(p¤) = °.
Since school i = 1;2 is indi®erent between ei and ti in state Ui, the single-crossing condition
implies that it will choose ei in state Fi. Uniqueness of equilibrium is established by the
monotonicity of the k(p) function. One can verify that both q(F1je1;e2) and q(F1je1;t2)
are decreasing in p. Further, q(F1je1;e2) · q(F1je1;t2) if and only if z · 1
2. Thus, if z · 1
2,
then k0(p) < 0 and the solution to the equation k(p) = ° is unique.
In an in°ationary pooling equilibrium, each school i = 1;2 chooses ei in both states
with probability 1. Upon observing e1 and e2, we have q(F1je1;e2) = 1
2. Competitive wage








Let the out-of-equilibrium belief be that school 1's state is U1 when t1 is observed. Then
the competitive wage o®er is !G for A-students. One can verify that since ° · 1
2, in state
U1 school 1 weakly prefers e1 to t1. By the single-crossing condition, weak preference for
e1 in state U1 implies strict preference for e1 in state F1. Q.E.D.
Multiple semi-pooling equilibria can occur when z is close to 1. The logic behind
the di®erence between negative and positive correlation is quite intuitive. In both cases,
the condition for an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium is that the probability p of
in°ating the grades is such that the probability k(p) of fooling the market is equal to the
exogenous parameter °. Under negative correlation, k(p) decreases with p both because the
market becomes more skeptical of good grades (q(F1je1;e2) and q(F1je1;t2) decrease) and
because it is more likely that the market observes easy grades in both schools, which is bad
news because the states are negative correlated (q(F1je1;e2) < q(F1je1;t2) when z < 1
2).
Monotonicity of k(p) means that there can be at most one semi-pooling equilibrium. The
situation is di®erent with positive correlation. A greater p still means a more skeptical
market, but having easy grades in both schools is now good for the schools. As a result
k(p) can increase over some range of p. Indeed, when z is close to 1, the function k(p)
is non-monotone so that multiple semi-pooling equilibria occur for ° just below and just
above 1


























A. Correlation and In°ated Grades
In this subsection, we examine how the degree of correlation of states across the two schools
a®ects their equilibrium probabilities of in°ating the grades. Positive correlation in the
quality of the student bodies across schools may arise because general economic conditions
(e.g., business cycles, the size of the skills premium) a®ect the decision to enter college,
or because the overall environment of teaching and research a®ects the value-added of the
education process. On the other hand, competition by schools for the same cohort of good
students may result in a negative correlation of states.
Are schools more like to in°ate when states become more (positively or negatively)
correlated?
We restrict our attention to the case ° > 1
2, so that an in°ationary semi-pooling
equilibrium always exists. The condition for the equilibrium probability p¤ of in°ating the
grades is k(p¤;z) = °. If p¤ is unique, then @p¤=@z has the same sign as @k=@z. If there
are multiple solutions to the equilibrium condition, then the same conclusion applies when





(1 + (3 ¡ 2z)p + 2zp2)(1 ¡ p)p(1 ¡ 2z)
(z + 2(1 ¡ z) + zp2)2(1 ¡ z + zp)2 :
Thus, @k(p;z)=@z has the same sign as 1¡2z. If z · 1
2, a decrease in z (increased negative
correlation) shifts the k(p) curve down and reduce the equilibrium probability of grade
exaggeration. If z ¸ 1
2, an increase in z (increased positive correlation) also shifts the k(p)
curve down and reduce grade exaggeration. See Figure I. Therefore, schools' equilibrium
probability of in°ating the grades reaches a maximum at z = 1
2, when the two schools
have independent states. Greater (positive or negative) correlation in states across the
two schools serves to constrain grade exaggeration.
Correlation constrains grade exaggeration because it reduces the probability that each
school fools the market with easy grades. A greater positive correlation has two opposing
e®ects: it improves the credibility of bilateral easy grades (increases q(F1je1;e2) for school
1) and reduces the credibility of unilateral easy grades (decreases q(F1je1;t2) for school 1).
However, a deciding third e®ect of an increase in positive correlation is that it becomes
more likely for employers to observe t2 under state U1. This makes fooling the market
more di±cult because under positive correlation unilateral easy grading is not as credible
as bilateral easy grading (q(F1je1;t2) < q(F1je1;e2) when z > 1
2). A greater negative
correlation also makes it more di±cult to fool the market, but for the opposite reason: it
makes it less likely for employers to observe t2 under U1, and under negative correlation
unilateral easy grades is the more credible signal.
The case of independent states (z = 1
2) is equivalent to the single-school case analyzed
in Section III. It might appear against one's intuition that grade exaggeration is generally
less serious with two schools than with a single school. But in our framework schools
do not directly compete with one another in placements or in any other way. The only
strategic interaction between schools comes from the underlying inference problem faced
by the labor market when the schools have correlated states. The problem of in°ated
grades is less serious with two schools because it is harder to fool the market when there
are two signals available instead of one.
24B. Strategic Interactions
We know from the single-school case that grade exaggeration at an isolated school can
result from a number of exogenous changes, such as a smaller R, a greater ¼, or a greater
ÁF=ÁU. How do changes in one school's grading policy a®ect other schools? How does the
new equilibrium compare with the one before the changes took place? The answers depend
on whether in°ationary grading policies at di®erent schools are strategic complements or
strategic substitutes.
For each school i = 1;2, denote i's equilibrium probability of in°ating the grades by
p¤




where °1 is de¯ned as in equation (6) using the parameter values for school 1. The function
k1 is given by
k1(p1;p2) = (1 ¡ z + zp2)q(F1je1;e2) + z(1 ¡ p2)q(F1je1;t2);
where q(F1je1;e2) and q(F1je1;t2) are given in equation (12). We will think of equation
(14) as de¯ning the \reaction function" p¤
1(p2) for school 1. For any °1 > 1
2, we have
k1(0;0) = 1 > °1, implying p¤
1(0) > 0. Similarly, k1(1;1) = 1
2 < °1, which implies
p¤
1(1) < 1. The same conclusion holds for school 2. Therefore, for any °1;°2 2 (1
2;1), there
exists at least one in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium.









For any z, we have:
@k1
@p1
= (1 ¡ z + zp2)
@q(F1je1;e2)
@p1




since both q(F1je1;e2) and q(F1je1;t2) are decreasing functions of p1. Also,
@k1
@p2





(z + (1 ¡ z)(p1 + p2) + zp1p2)2(1 ¡ z + zp1)
> 0:
25It follows that dp¤
1=dp2 > 0, and p1 and p2 are strategic complements.14
An increased probability of in°ating the grades by school 2 makes the event of both
schools having easy grades more likely. Under positive correlation, this helps school 1 fool
the market, because having easy grading at both schools is a stronger signal for state F1
than having easy grading at school 1 only (q(F1je1;e2) > q(F1je1;t2) when z > 1
2). But
the second e®ect is that it changes the market estimate of state F1 when both schools have
easy grades. Under positive correlation, an increase in p2 lowers q(F1je1;e2) because the
market will put more weight on the event that both schools are in°ating their grades. This
makes it more di±cult for school 1 to fool the market. The ¯rst e®ect dominates the second
e®ect under positive correlation, and the net e®ect of an increase in p2 is an increase in
k1(p1;p2). Under negative correlation, the sign as well as the relative magnitude of these
two e®ects are reversed, so the net result is still @k1=@p2 > 0.
Therefore, under both positive and negative correlation, it is easier for school 1 to fool
the market with in°ated grades when there is an increased use of grade exaggeration by
school 2. The result is that grade exaggeration is a supermodular game between the two
schools, suggesting the following illustrative adjustment process. Suppose that a school
does not adjust its grading policy in response to the other school instantaneously. Instead,
let pi be the optimal response to pj (i 6= j) with a one-period lag, as in a Cournot
adjustment process. When there is a decrease in °2 (resulting from, say, a decrease in
school 2's concern R2 for its good students) while °1 remains unchanged, school 2 will
raise its probability of in°ating the grades in response to this change. As p2 rises, even
though there is no change in the underlying parameters at school 1, school 1 ¯nds that it is
easier to fool the market into believing that its state is favorable when it gives easy grades.
So p1 rises in the next period. The increase in p1 prompts p2 to rise even further in the
subsequent period, and so on until the process converges to a new equilibrium level. When
adjustments are not instantaneous, therefore, a one-time change in exogenous parameters
can produce a series of endogenous changes in grading policies that resemble an in°ationary
trend. In other words, strategic interactions between the schools provide a \propagation
mechanism" through which grade exaggeration is transmitted from one school to another.
14 If the states in the two schools are uncorrelated, p1 and p2 are strategically independent.
26V. Signaling by Many Schools
The probability model we use in Section IV is suitable for studying how the degree of
correlation in student quality across two schools a®ects grade exaggeration; it is less °exible
for studying the case of more than two schools. Extending the analysis to signaling by
many schools is useful because it can provide comparative statics and limit results for
changes in the number of schools in the education system.
We build a stylized model with common shocks and idiosyncratic shocks.15 Let there
be two aggregate states, F and U, with prior probabilities µ and 1 ¡ µ, respectively. In
state U, each school i (i = 1;:::;N) is in state Ui with probability 1. They all have a
student body with a small proportion ÁU of good students. In state F, each school i has
an independent probability ¼ of reaching state Fi (with a greater proportion ÁF of good
students) and a probability 1 ¡ ¼ of reaching state Ui. Each school knows its own state,
but not those of other schools.16
Consider an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium, in which each school i chooses easy
grading ei with probability 1 in state Fi and with probability p in state Ui. As in Sections
III and IV, equilibrium is characterized by the condition k(p;N) = °, where ° is a function
of the exogenous parameters as de¯ned in equation (6), and the function k(p;N) is school
i's assessment of how easy it is for it to \fool" the market into believing that the state is
Fi when ei is observed. We proceed to derive an explicit expression for k(p;N).
If the aggregate state is favorable (F), then the total probability that any one school
will choose easy grading is ¼+(1¡¼)p. If the aggregate state is unfavorable (U), then the
probability that any one school will choose easy grading is just p. Conditional on state Ui,
the probability of the aggregate state being F is given by
¹ =
µ(1 ¡ ¼)
µ(1 ¡ ¼) + 1 ¡ µ
:
15 This type of model necessarily implies positive correlation across any two schools. It is also possible
to construct models with negative correlation with three or more schools. For example, if there are N
schools in total and the state of a ¯xed number Y of the N schools is F and the state of the rest N ¡ Y
schools is U, then the states of any two individual schools are negatively correlated. The analysis in this
model is similar to the model presented below with positive correlation.
16 This model includes the single-school case analyzed before as a special case, with N = 1 and µ = 1.
If we let N = 2, ¼ = z, µ = 1=(2z), then it becomes the two-school model with positive correlation.
27Therefore, if school i chooses easy grading in state Ui, its assessment of the probability
that the market observes a total of l (l = 1;:::;N) schools with easy grades is
Pr[ljUi] = ¹b(N ¡ 1;l ¡ 1;¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p) + (1 ¡ ¹)b(N ¡ 1;l ¡ 1;p);
where b(¢;¢;¢) denotes the binomial probability function (i.e., b(N;l;p) is the probability
of observing l successes out of N Bernoulli trials with independent probability of success
p). Let q(Fijl) be the market's assessment of the probability of state Fi when there are
l schools (including school i) that chooses easy grading. Then, applying Bayes' rule, we
have
q(Fijl) =
µb(N;l;¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p)
µb(N;l;¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p) + (1 ¡ µ)b(N;l;p)
¼
¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p
:
The ¯rst fraction on the right-hand-side is the probability that the aggregate state is F
given l schools with easy grades; the second fraction is the probability that school i is in
the favorable state given that the aggregate state is favorable. The total probability of





The function k(p;N) is continuous with k(0;N) = 1 and k(1;N) = µ¼. Therefore for
any ¯nite N, an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium exists if ° > µ¼. One can also show
that an in°ationary pooling equilibrium exists if ° · µ¼. In Appendix B we show that
k(p;N + 1) < k(p;N) for all p 2 (0;1). The presence of more schools, and hence more
independent signals, makes it more di±cult for any individual school to \fool" the market.
Consequently, a larger N causes the equilibrium probability p¤ of grade exaggeration to
fall.
If an increase in N reduces grade exaggeration, will in°ated grades disappear when
there are arbitrarily many schools? In other words, will the equilibrium probability of
grade exaggeration converge to 0, or will it converge to a limit bounded away from 0?
When N is arbitrarily large, in a semi-pooling equilibrium, the proportion of schools with
easy grades is p in the aggregate state U, and is ¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p in the aggregate state F.
Thus, the market can perfectly infer the aggregate state from the proportion of schools
28with easy grades. When school i observes that its own state is unfavorable Ui, it infers
that there is a probability ¹ that the aggregate state is favorable. In that case, the market
observes a fraction ¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p of the schools with easy grades, knowing that only a
fraction ¼ of the schools are truly in the favorable state. Therefore, the market assigns a
probability Pr[FijF] = ¼=(¼ +(1¡¼)p) that the student mix in school i is favorable. The
school also perceives that with probability 1 ¡ ¹, the aggregate state is unfavorable. In
that case, the market can tell with certainty that the aggregate state is unfavorable, and
assigns a probability Pr[FijU] = 0 that the student mix in school i is favorable. Thus, the
probability that school i can fool the market into believing that its student mix is favorable
by in°ating its grades is
k(p;1) = ¹Pr[FijF] + (1 ¡ ¹)Pr[FijU] =
¹¼
¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p
:
For N arbitrarily large, the condition for an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium is given
by the equation k(p;1) = °. The function k(p;1) is decreasing in p, with k(0;1) = ¹
and k(1;1) = ¹¼. The same arguments as in Proposition 1 establish:
Proposition 4. For N arbitrarily large, an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium exists
if ° 2 (¹¼;¹).
Thus, in°ated grades can persist even in the limit as the number of schools grows
inde¯nitely. However, if ° ¸ ¹, the probability of fooling the market for each school i in
state Ui is lower than what it takes for it to be indi®erent between ei and ti, even if in
equilibrium no school in°ates grades. We then have a separating equilibrium, with honest
grading by each school.17 Therefore, an increase in number of schools can potentially
eliminate grade exaggeration when ° is large enough.18
17 For any ¯nite N, an in°ationary semi-pooling equilibrium exists even in this case. However, the
probability of grade exaggeration is arbitrarily close to zero when N is large.
18 If ° is relatively small, an in°ationary pooling equilibrium may occur. In such an equilibrium, the
observed proportion of schools with easy grades is in both state F and state U, so the market cannot
distinguish the two aggregate states. The competitive wage o®er for A-students from any school with easy
grades is then w(AjF;e) = µ¼!G + (1 ¡ µ¼)!. The probability of fooling the market with in°ated grades
is µ¼, instead of k(1;1) = ¹¼. This discontinuity in the probability of fooling the market at p = 1 is due
to the fact that the market is able to distinguish the two aggregate states except when p = 1. The result
is that there exists an in°ationary pooling equilibrium if and only if ° · µ¼.
29VI. Curbing Inflated Grades
If grade exaggeration garbles the signaling value of grades and reduces the welfare of the
school, are there feasible ways to curb it? In this section, we use our model to discuss
two methods that have been proposed (and adopted by some schools) to tame grade
exaggeration.
Some universities have experimented with putting two grades on student transcripts:
the student's individual grade and the class average grade (The Economist, April 12, 2001).
The idea is to provide employers with more information to evaluate the meaning of any
individual job applicant's grades. If employers have static or adaptive expectations about a
school's grading policy, such a move can reduce their \grade illusion" and hence remove the
school's temptation to in°ate grades. Although we do not dispute the value of providing
more information on transcripts, we doubt if this can solve the problem of in°ated grades.
Schools in°ate their grades because sometimes easy grades are justi¯ed. A high class
average grade does not immediately imply lax grading; perhaps the school just happens
to have a lot of good students. In our model, employers can perfectly observe the class
average grade (i.e., the percentage of A's and B's), yet equilibrium grade exaggeration
persists.
Another strategy to tame grade exaggeration is to assess students strictly on the basis
of ranks. Some universities, for example, ¯x the proportion of their students graduating
with honors (The New York Times, May 22, 1988), so that a good student may not receive
honors if his peers are outstanding.19 This kind of policy requires commitment, since we
have shown in Section III that tough grading is not an equilibrium in our signaling model.
Nevertheless, committing to a ¯xed proportion of A's is a lot easier than committing to
honest grading. The latter requires varying the proportion of A's with the underlying state,
which is unveri¯able. The former only requires the school to give the same proportion of
A's every year. The school's reputation can su®er if it breaks its commitment.
19 In the case of stock recommendations, some investment banks are experimenting with committing
themselves to some ¯xed percentage of \sell" recommendations.
30Committing to a ¯xed proportion of A's is not a ¯rst-best policy, since the proportion
of good students changes from year to year. It is therefore interesting to see whether the
commitment policy is better than the equilibrium policy with grade exaggeration from the
school's perspective. Let V (Á) be the school's payo® when it commits to giving a ¯xed
proportion Á of A grades. Naturally, Á lies between ÁU and ÁF. Under this policy, the
competitive wage for A-students is

























+ (1 ¡ ¼)!M:
Then,
V (Á) =¼(RÁw(A) + R(ÁF ¡ Á)w(B) + (1 ¡ ÁF)w(B))
+ (1 ¡ ¼)(RÁUw(A) + (Á ¡ ÁU)w(A) + (1 ¡ Á)w(B)):
Observe that as Á increases, both w(A) and w(B) decrease but the coe±cient of w(A) in
V (Á) increases, so there are two opposing e®ects. A few steps of calculations show that









If V (Á) has a stationary point in the range (ÁU;ÁF), the stationary point is a local mini-
mum. It follows that the optimal commitment level Á is either ÁU or ÁF.
Would a commitment to tough grading or easy grading improve on the school's equi-
librium payo®? To answer the question, we ¯rst note that when the school is in an in°a-
tionary pooling equilibrium, its payo® is just V (ÁF). Also, the payo® in an in°ationary
semi-pooling equilibrium is greater than V (ÁF), because in such equilibrium the school is
indi®erent between easy grading and tough grading in state U, with an equilibrium wage
to A-students higher than that with a commitment to ÁF. Thus, we only need to compare
the equilibrium payo® V ¤ to V (ÁU). It can be easily shown that V ¤ < V (ÁU) if and only
if
(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ q(Fje))
ÁU
ÁF
¡ ¼21 ¡ ÁF
1 ¡ ÁU







31In an in°ationary pooling equilibrium q(Fje) = ¼, so the above condition becomes
(15) (1 ¡ ¼)2ÁU
ÁF
> ¼21 ¡ ÁF
1 ¡ ÁU
:














+ 1 ¡ ¼
¶
:
In either type of equilibrium, it is possible that commitment to tough grading makes
the school strictly better o®.20 In a pooling equilibrium, grade exaggeration is at the
highest level. If this results from the high prior probability of the favorable state, then
commitment to tough grading can hurt the school: an increase in ¼ tends to reverse (15).
In fact, condition (15) cannot be satis¯ed if ¼ is su±ciently great. Intuitively, commitment
to tough grading can be too costly because it often forces the school to give B's to some
of its good students. In a semi-pooling equilibrium, grade exaggeration is limited due to
a lower likelihood of the favorable state or a greater concern for good students. The same
two factors tend to reverse the inequality of equation (16). In this case the bene¯t to the
school from the commitment to tough grading is small relative to its cost, and the school
will not make such commitment even if it is credible.
Given that schools may not have the incentive to self-discipline, external inducements
may be necessary to curb grade exaggeration, which would be worthwhile if, for example,
sorting of workers is important for economic e±ciency. One way of discouraging grade
exaggeration is to align the interest of the school more closely with the welfare of its good
students (increase R in our model). This may be achieved by tying a school's funding more
closely to the long-term labor market performance of its students. Greater tax bene¯ts
for alumni donations (assuming that the marginal propensity to contribute increases with
income) or increased public funding for schools to reward outstanding achievements of
their alumni will make it more in the interest of the school to ensure that the abilities of
good students are duly recognized by the market. Over the long run, this can encourage
more honest grading in schools.
20 Conditions (15) and (16) coincide when ¼ = °, when they are most likely to be satis¯ed.
32VII. Summary and Discussion
If grades convey information about the relative merits of students, why would schools have
the incentive to adopt overly liberal grading standards? The answer we propose is that
employers cannot fully distinguish between a situation in which a school is giving lots of
easy A's and a situation in which the school simply has many good students. Indeed,
because a school with more good students has an incentive to give more A's, employers
use a liberal grading curve as a signal to infer high overall student quality in the school.
This does not imply that grades will shoot to the roof, since schools also care about
preserving the value of A's for its good students. We identify an equilibrium level of grade
exaggeration in this paper, and are able to show that honest grading or other kinds of
grading policies (such as grade de°ation) are not reasonable equilibrium outcomes in our
setting.
In°ated grades help mediocre students at the expense of good students. In a manner
similar to the central bank dilemma (Kydland and Prescott [1977]), schools would gain if
they could commit to an honest grading policy. Our comparative statics results show that
schools less concerned with its good students or schools with a higher chance of having
a large fraction of good student are more likely to in°ate the grades. In an environment
with multiple schools, we show that grade exaggeration by one school makes it easier for
another school to fool the market with in°ated grades. Thus in°ationary grading policies
are strategic complements, and this provides a channel that makes grade exaggeration
contagious. Nevertheless the availability of signals from other schools does reduce the
equilibrium level of grade exaggeration in our setup.
The problem of in°ated grades is multi-faceted, and we do not pretend to have covered
all grounds in this paper. Our model is an equilibrium model with little dynamics. It
explains why grades are too high, but aside from our comparative statics results and
our discussion of the Cournot adjustment process, it says little about why they keep
rising. One possible approach to explicitly model the dynamics of grade in°ation is to
introduce ambiguity and reputation e®ects as in central bank models of monetary in°ation
(Cukierman and Meltzer [1986]; Rogo® [1987]). We believe that the tradeo® between
33helping mediocre students and hurting good students, as well as the signaling constraints
needed to sustain equilibrium, will provide the basic building blocks of a dynamic model.
In this paper, competitive interaction among schools is restricted to their signaling
strategies. But schools compete in other dimensions too. For example, if there are rents in
a ¯xed number of desirable positions, good students may bene¯t disproportionately from
a tight grading policy in the competition for these positions. Furthermore, since grading
policies a®ect the relative well-being of di®erent types of students, they have implications
for the competition for incoming students and for the sorting of students by schools as
well. These interesting questions have not been addressed in our present work.
Finally, we have not looked into issues related to the role of grades as motivator. A
paper by Costrell [1994] studies how educational standards a®ect students' incentives to
exert e®ort. In that paper, lower standards (grade exaggeration) can reduce the e®ort
of good students while raising the e®ort of the marginal students. Incorporating student
e®ort into our model probably reinforces our conclusion about the welfare e®ects of grade
exaggeration. We also note that students may try to obtain better grades by exerting
pressure on their professors. This aspect of the problem of in°ated grades is particularly
interesting when studied in the context of stock recommendations and audit reports. To
what extent can companies o®er economic inducements that alter the information dissem-
inated by stock analysts and auditors? Can independent information providers survive in
this kind of environment? We hope our signaling model of in°ated grades will be a ¯rst
step toward addressing this type of issues.
Appendix
A. Equilibrium Selection
In this appendix we rule out the existence of any equilibrium other than the in°ationary
equilibria in the single-school setting of Section III.
One of the two possible separating equilibria|truthful grading|can be ruled out
immediately. If the school's grading outcome truthfully re°ects the ability mix of its
students, then upon observing easy grading, the market would conclude that the state
34is favorable, which would prompt the school to in°ate grades when the state is actually
unfavorable.
Next, we rule out the \reverse separating equilibria" (where the school chooses t in
state F and e in state U), the \double-pooling equilibria" (where it randomizes between
e and t in both states), and the \reverse semi-pooling equilibria" (where it randomizes
between t and e in state F and chooses e in state U, or it randomizes between t and e in state
U and chooses t in state F). To have any one of these three types of equilibria, the school
must (i) weakly prefer e to t in state U; and (ii) weakly prefer t to e in state F. For this
to be true, the sign of the single-crossing condition (1) has to be reversed. In other words,
we require (R ¡ 1)(ÁF ¡ ÁU)(w(Aje) ¡ w(Bjt)) · 0, which implies that w(Bjt) ¸ w(Aje).
Furthermore, since the school chooses e in state U with positive probability under the
proposed equilibria, we have w(Aje) < !G. Similarly, since the school chooses t in state
F with positive probability under the proposed equilibria, we have w(Bjt) > !M. These
three inequalities imply that
RÁUw(Aje)+(ÁF ¡ÁU)w(Aje)+(1¡ÁF)!M < RÁU!G+(ÁF ¡ÁU)w(Bjt)+(1¡ÁF)w(Bjt);
which contradicts the assumption that the school weakly prefers easy grading to tough
grading in the unfavorable state.
Next, we rule out \de°ationary semi-pooling equilibria", where the school randomizes
between t and e in state F and chooses t in state U. Such an equilibrium does not directly
contradict the single-crossing condition, because by equation (1) the school's indi®erence
between t and e in state F implies its strict preference for t in state U as long as w(Aje) >
w(Bjt), which is true in equilibrium as w(Aje) = !G. However, any such equilibrium can
be ruled out because the school cannot be indi®erent in state F. To see this, note that in










+ (1 ¡ ¼)!M;
with equality only if the school chooses t with probability 1 in state F. The above condi-
tions imply that for the school to be indi®erent between t and e, one would need
R(ÁF ¡ ÁU)





35which is impossible because the left-hand-side of the above inequality is greater than
(ÁF ¡ ÁU)=(1 ¡ ÁU).
Finally, consider a \de°ationary pooling equilibrium," in which the school chooses














+ (1 ¡ ¼)!M:
If a deviation to e is observed, B-students get !M, and the wage w(Aje) for A-students lies
between ! and !G. This type of pooling equilibria always exist because in each state the
school strictly prefers e to t if w(Aje) is su±ciently close to !. But it is sustained by the
market belief that state F is su±ciently unlikely so that the wage w(Aje) paid to A-students
is too low to make such deviation pro¯table. This belief is out of the equilibrium path,
and therefore unrestricted by the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium adopted
here. However, such belief is unreasonable, and the de°ationary pooling equilibrium can
be ruled out by the standard re¯nement criterion D1 (Banks and Sobel's [1987]). To show
this, it su±ces to establish that the lowest wage w(Aje) for A-students that induces a
deviation to e is higher in state U than in state F. This condition can be written as:
RÁU!G + (ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Bjt) + (1 ¡ ÁF)(w(Bjt) ¡ !M)
RÁU + ÁF ¡ ÁU
>
RÁU!G + R(ÁF ¡ ÁU)w(Bjt) + (1 ¡ ÁF)(w(Bjt) ¡ !M)
RÁU + R(ÁF ¡ ÁU)
:
One can verify that the above always holds. It ensures that the set of wage o®ers that
would induce deviation to easy grading under state F strictly contains the set of wage
o®ers that would induce deviation under state U. Thus, the school is \in¯nitely more
likely" to make such deviation in state F than in state U. When deviation to easy grading
is observed, the market should then believe that the state is F. This belief will not support
a de°ationary pooling equilibrium, as the school would indeed deviate in state F.
B. Decreasing Probability of Fooling the Market
In this appendix, we prove that in the model of many schools of Section V, the probability
of fooling the market falls as the number of schools increases. That is, k(p;N) > k(p;N+1)
for all p 2 (0;1).
36Denote x = ¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p > p. Let
g(l;N) =
¹xl¡1(1 ¡ x)N¡l + (1 ¡ ¹)pl¡1(1 ¡ p)N¡l
µxl(1 ¡ x)N¡l + (1 ¡ µ)pl(1 ¡ p)N¡l
µ¼




















xl(1 ¡ x)N¡l+1g(l;N + 1):














for l = 2;:::;N, we can rewrite equation (17) as
























xl(1 ¡ x)N¡l (g(l;N) ¡ (1 ¡ x)g(l;N + 1) ¡ xg(l + 1;N + 1)):
Tedious calculation gives
(18)





¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)p













µxl(1 ¡ x)N¡l + (1 ¡ µ)pl(1 ¡ p)N¡l¢¡
µxl(1 ¡ x)N¡l+1 + (1 ¡ µ)pl(1 ¡ p)N¡l+1¢
£
¡
µxl+1(1 ¡ x)N¡l + (1 ¡ µ)pl+1(1 ¡ p)N¡l¢
:
Since (1 ¡ ¹)=¹ > (1 ¡ µ)=µ and since x > p, the expression in (18) is positive. Therefore
k(p;N) > k(p;N + 1).
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